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Abstract
This article aims to use a bargaining power model to reduce moral
hazard—in the form of entrepreneurial effort shirking—and derive an opti-
mum sharing ratio of a Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) contract that involves
a Venture Capitalist and an Entrepreneur. The model reveals the following
interesting findings. First, under complete information—where the Venture
Capitalist has a bargaining power - Venture Capitalist offers the entrepre-
neur a profit sharing ratio that is less than her capital contribution ratio.
Second, in an incomplete information setting, the entrepreneur demands a
profit sharing ratio higher than her capital contribution ratio when the sum
of the marginal cost (from exercising a higher effort) and private benefits
(from exercising a low effort) is greater than the marginal return (from
exercising a high effort). In addition, the model is used to derive a span of
negotiation about the profit sharing ratio. Finally, an agent based simula-
tion (Netlogo) platform is considered to implement the model, which allows
a faster numerical calculations of the profit share and helps decide on the
validity of the funding contract.
KEYWORD S
agent-based simulation (Netlogo), finance, moral hazards, optimal profit-sharing, profit and loss
sharing contracts
1 | INTRODUCTION
Venture Capitalists (VCs) are known for their role in
financing start-up companies that are subject to high
risk of failure due to their innovative nature. However,
it is shown that they attribute the investment success
or failure more to the team involved in running the
project than to the business (Gompers, Gornall,
Kaplan, & Strebulaev, 2020). Therefore venture capital-
ists, needs to monitor more intensively as they face a
higher cost of capital (Winton & Yerramilli, 2008).
Accordingly, given the high risk of VCs financing
many studies have examined the causes of such risks.
Some of those studies are empirical in nature; see for
example (Cochrane, 2005), (Baierl, Kaplan, et al., 2002),
(Hall & Lerner, 2010) (Jain, 2001) Jain (2001), and
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003) and (Tykvová, 2007) while
others are theoretical; see (Casamatta, 2003), (Elitzur &
Gavious, 2003), (Keuschnigg & Nielsen, 2003b),
(Keuschnigg & Nielsen, 2003a).
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Yet, Despite their different approaches in tackling the
causes of the above-mentioned risks, all these studies
agree that failure risks are mainly due to agency prob-
lems between VC (he) and the financed entrepreneur
(she). One substantial example of agency problem is
moral hazard, where one party acts in a selfish manner
regardless of the actions of their partners, see (Elitzur &
Gavious, 2003). Moral hazards manifests in different
ways. In our paper, we tackle one specific, yet recurrent,
aspect of moral hazards: Entrepreneur's effort shirking.
Such shirking behavior is unobservable to the VC and
can be interpreted in terms of incomplete information or
asymmetric information. In order to reduce this problem
of effort shirking, we contribute to literature by introduc-
ing a new bargaining model that strive to derive an
optimum profit sharing ratio in a Profit and Loss sharing
contract involving a VC and an entrepreneur. This model
takes into account the capital contribution as well as the
expertise level of each participants in determining
the extent of each participants bargaining power over the
profit share. To provide realism to the model, the opti-
mality of the profit sharing ratio needs to satisfy:
• The VC's and the entrepreneur participation con-
straints. That is, both participants gaining at least their
opportunity cost (reservation utility).
• The entrepreneur's incentive compatibility constraints.
That is, the entrepreneur gain more by exercising
higher effort than by exercising a lower effort.
In our trial to develop this new model, the rest of the
paper will be organized as follows: Section 2 presents a
literature review where we put the effort shirking prob-
lem in relation to other problems of moral hazards in
their current debates context. Section 3 introduces our
model and discusses the methodology we adopt. Section 4
presents our main results and their discussion. Section 5
implements our model using an agent based simulation
(Netlogo) platform and Section 6 concludes with a sum-
mary and possible extensions. The proofs of the main
results of the paper can be found in the appendix.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
Moral hazards in joint venture such as, Profit and Loss
Sharing (PLS) contracts, might manifest in many ways
other than the shirking of the entrepreneur in terms of
effort. First, moral hazard can be related to the quality
and ability of the entrepreneur seeking the financing.
Some entrepreneurs exaggerates on their abilities and the
way they represents the success prospects of their pro-
jects. Evidence shows that exaggerating entrepreneurs
raise more funds in less time(Momtaz, 2020) compared to
other entrepreneurs. This, therefore, increases the risk of
attracting low ability entrepreneurs in a venture project.
Second aspect of moral hazards is the disagreement
between the VC and the entrepreneur that take place
after the investment is being made. Under this way,
research that are based on control theory - see for exam-
ple Dessein (2002) who proposes a balanced decision
making process where entrepreneur are given decision
making power at some stages of the investment process,
while the VC are given decision power at other stages.
Third example of moral hazards in VC's financing is
profit misreporting. In fact, most existing literature
usually focuses on earnings misreporting (Crocker &
Slemrod, 2007), (Cornelli & Yosha, 2003), (Merle, Hanlon, &
MAYDEW, 2006). It is argued that under equity financing,
where the financier is the only shareholder, the entrepre-
neur can hide part of the sales and, therefore, misreport
profits (Fakir, Fairchild, & Tkiouat, 2019). This is also con-
sistent with the findings of Tkiouat, and Allam (2019)
where misreporting risk under equity financing such as
VCs is more acute than it is under debt financing. While
this manipulation of earnings protect, unethically, the
entrepreneur against the risk of a low payoff when produc-
tion is unsuccessful (Miglo, 2010) it does erode the finan-
ciers payoffs.
The final example of moral hazards, which is the sub-
stance of our paper, is effort shirking. In fact, many
researches have tried to solve for the optimal sharing of
profits between a VC and an entrepreneur under the risk
of entrepreneurs effort shirking. For example it is found
that allocation of equity share depends upon the level of
complementarity of efforts between a VC and an entre-
preneur (Vergara, Bonilla, & Sepulveda, 2016). In our
work we argue that studying the effort of the entrepre-
neur is more important than studying the effort of the
VC in making the venture a success. We believe that a
VCs have no choice but to provide a high effort. This is
due to the fact that they are, usually, the main financiers
of the venture while the entrepreneur, usually, contrib-
utes to the venture with little to no financial contribu-
tion. Similarly another work shows that occupations
providing workers with managerial knowledge foster
entrepreneurial effort (Laffineur, Barbosa, Fayolle, &
Montmartin, 2020). While this is linked to workers rather
than entrepreneurs, we can make a concrete analogy
here. In fact, the VC contribute to the venture not only
financially but also through their expertise and knowl-
edge. Therefore, we argue that this additional expertise
could be used as a bargaining power to sustain and
induce the entrepreneur to undertake high effort. In the
same context, the effort devoted to entrepreneurship
depends on individuals' perception that their personal
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abilities in a chosen entrepreneurial activity will lead to
success (effort-performance relationship) and that
the outcome will provide better marginal reward
compared to other career choices (Manolova, Brush, &
Edelman, 2008), (Renko, Kroeck, & Bullough, 2012)
(Thompson, 2009). In our model we make use of this
point through the incentive compatibility constraint
where exercising of a higher effort should lead to a better
outcome than exercising a low effort.
Another research has also tackled the effort shirking
of the entrepreneur when choosing between a VC and an
Angel (Fairchild, 2011). The entrepreneur may exercise
high effort if there is a higher value creating ability from
the VC or a strong empathetic relationship with the
Angel. This work is different than ours in that we focus
on the tangible qualities of the VC such as Capital and
expertise rather than behavioral qualities such as empa-
thy. Our work is, also, different as we focus on the
bargaining power of each participant in determining the
optimum profit share.
In dealing with, moral hazard problem such as effort
shirking, many studies argue that the VC should require
a certain rate of return, see for example (Mason &
Harrison, 2002) and (Manigart et al., 2002). Following
this approach, our model suggests that any future invest-
ment by the VC will not occur if the VC does not expect
the project to yield an expected profit greater than zero.
This concept of break even rate of return also reflects a
competition among VCs over the funding of the project.
Furthermore, VCs face uncertain circumstances called
external risks; see (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). These
external risks include demand for new products, competi-
tors' response to new product, and perception of financial
markets when it comes to selling project stake at exit
stage. Regarding the first external risk on demand for
new products, our model allows for a range of expected
revenues. While we believe that future demand cannot
be estimated accurately, a hypothetical upper value esti-
mate can be integrated in our model. For the second risk,
in our model the competition effect can endogenously be
reflected in our estimates of future demand.
Because the VCs would have less information about
the likelihood of entrepreneurs shirking, this would create
less trust between the parties. This lack of trust would
induce the VC to apply a higher risk premium and argue
for a larger share of the firm's equity than the entrepreneur
deems reasonable(Douglas, Carlsson-Wall, & Hjelström,
2014). Given these facts around the causes of moral
hazards in entrepreneurial financing, there is a serious
need for tools that can overcome hidden information prob-
lems and accurately target capital to entrepreneurs that
can use it well (Field, Pande, Papp, & Rigol, 2013). To
develop such tools we make recourse to researches that
dealt with bargaining power in reducing the problem of
moral hazards with a focus on effort shirking.
Indeed, a number of contributions examine how the
relative bargaining power of entrepreneur and VC, for
example, proxied by experience, affects contracts and
allocation of cash flow as well as control rights
(Burchardt, Hommel, Kamuriwo, & Billitteri, 2016).
Cumming and binti Johan (2008) show on the basis of
their European sample that more experienced entrepre-
neurs are more likely to finance themselves with com-
mon equity and correspondingly less likely to employ
convertible preferred equity. VCs represent the mirror
image with investment experience being positively
related to the use of convertible preferred equity and
negatively related to the use of common equity. These
results are also consistent with Kaplan, Martel, and
Strömberg (2007) and Hsu (2004) who show that investor
sophistication leads to more favorable deal terms, which
entrepreneurs willingly grant in exchange for their affilia-
tion with more reputed financing partners. In the same
line Fairchild (2004) found that welfare is maximized
when the venture capitalist has high value-adding capa-
bilities, the market for reputation is informationally effi-
cient, and the manager has bargaining power. Our work
gives more flexibility to these findings as both partici-
pants have a degree of bargaining power, which is depen-
dent on their expertise and capital contribution in the
project. For example the more a VC has an expertise
compared to the entrepreneur, the more they are in a
comparative advantage to get a higher profit share. Fur-
thermore, the degree of bargaining power also deter-
mines the control structure choice between an
entrepreneur and investors. For example, it is sown that
as the VC's bargaining power increases, the more they
are involved in jointly controlling the projects(Wang,
Zhou, & An, 2017). This control, in favor of the VC, will
even increase when the entrepreneur financing needs
increases. In other words, as the VC contributes with
more capital, they would gain more control and, hence
have more comparative advantage in getting a higher
profit share. As a consequence, the control of the VC's
over the venture should also increase when the entrepre-
neurs private benefits increases(Wang et al., 2017). This,
in turn, results in higher monitoring costs and, as a con-
sequence, a higher required profit share by the VC.
In our opinion, the fact that there is an increase in
the control by the VC in a PLS contract due to an
increase in the financing needs and private benefits leads
to two main pivot of bargaining:
• More VC's expertise as the VC is involved in the con-
trolling the project. In fact, by jointly controlling the
projects VCs still benefit the startup and the
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entrepreneur, due to their positive value creation. This,
however, shifts the bargaining power to VCs and bene-
fits them at the expense of entrepreneurs (Ewens,
Gorbenko, & Korteweg, 2019). In addition The advi-
sory services, which VCs provide become a key factor
for the success of a business. As stated by Casa-
matta (2003), entrepreneurs are endowed with creativ-
ity and technical skills in developing innovative ideas,
but they often lack business experience and require the
assistance that VCs can offer.
• More capital contribution in case the entrepreneur
needs more financing (Wang et al., 2017).
Therefore, we focus on the VC capital contribution
and expertise as two important determinants in the
bargaining over the profit share. Our model is based on
sharing profits and losses between the VC and the entre-
preneur in a Profit and Loss sharing contract (PLS). In
this model, profit is determined based on expected future
profits and not on a fixed amount or as a percentage of
investment. In other words, in our model there is no
guaranteed return to the financier as in the case of debt
or standard VC contract, and there is no guaranteed
return to the entrepreneur as in the case of fixed wages.
Losses are determined according to each participant's
share in the project's capital.
3 | THE MODEL
We consider a one period PLS contract between a risk
neutral financier VC and an entrepreneur. Both partici-
pants agree on a partnership contract that specifies the
following elements:
• x: The VC's percentage share of the project capital
• I: The project's required funding
• α: The VC's share of the project's profit
• β: The VC's share of the project's loss
Notice that in this model, VC cannot lose more than
his percentage capital contribution x. This a dis-
tinguishing feature from the conventional setting where
the VC might demand guarantees against losses of more
than his capital contribution. Moreover, in running the
project, the entrepreneur exercises an effort ei, where i 
h = high, l = low. Thereafter, we assume that the
project's estimated revenue can take an upper value
R= 1+rð ÞI > I with a probability θh under high effort
and θl under low effort, such that θh> θl and r>0 .
Conversely, this revenue can take a lower value
R= 1+ rð ÞI < I with a probability (1-θh) under high effort
and R<0 with a probability (1-θl) under low effort. In
this model, the expected project profit under the high
and low efforts are given respectively as:
NPV = θhR+ 1−θhð ÞR−I >0 ð1Þ
NPV = θlR+ 1−θlð ÞR− I <0 ð2Þ
In exercising her effort, the entrepreneur incurs a dis-
utility D(ei) = d(ei) (1- x) I, which is expressed as a per-
centage d(ei) of her investment in the project, (1-x) I,
when exercising effort (ei). Exercising a higher effort
results in higher dis-utility compared to exercising lower
effort such that D(eh) > D(el). In addition, by exercising a
low effort, the entrepreneur enjoys private benefit S = s
(1- x) I, which is expressed as a percentage “s” of her
investment in the project. The entrepreneur also has a
reservation utility (opportunity cost) U = u (1- x)I that
we express as a percentage “u” of her investment in the
project. Using the above elements, we can extract the
expected return to the entrepreneur and VC under high
and low efforts respectively:
E re=ei
 
= 1−αð Þθir+ 1−βð Þ 1−θið Þr ð3Þ
E rvc=ei
 
= αθir+ β 1−θið Þr ð4Þ
such that:




We next discuss the methodology that we follow to
solve our model. As we pointed out previously, we aim to
reduce moral hazard in a PLS contract involving an
entrepreneur and a VC. In our model, Moral hazard
manifest itself in the entrepreneur exercising a low effort
in running the project. Faced with the situation, VC
needs to determine ex-ante the optimal profit-sharing
ratio. The latter is derived by following three steps. First,
we start by developing a sharing ratio under entrepre-
neurial observable effort. While this is not going to solve
the moral hazard problem, it can serve as basis line for
profit share negotiation. Second, we develop a span of
profit-sharing ratio in an incomplete information setting
where entrepreneurial effort is un-observable. Third, we
provide a bargaining setting to determine the optimal
sharing ratio from the span provided in the second step.
Finally, an Agent based Simulation (Netlogo) platform is
used as decision tool to help determine the optimal ratio.
The use of the simulation is used to mitigate against the
stochastic nature of the project revenues.
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4 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To obtain our theoretical results in terms of reducing
moral hazard and derive an optimum sharing ratio of a
Profit and Loss Sharing contract that involves a Venture
Capitalist and an Entrepreneur, we proceed by following
two steps. The first step analyses the model under entre-
preneurial observable effort. The second step would ana-
lyze the model under incomplete information in the form
of entrepreneurs unobservable effort.
4.1 | The model under entrepreneurial
observable effort
Under this scenario, the entrepreneur cannot deviate
from her commitment to provide a high effort. Therefore,
the VC is in a comparative advantage in terms of negoti-
ating the profit-sharing ratio. In other words, the objec-
tive of the VC would be to minimize the remuneration Re
of the entrepreneur up to a level that equates to her reser-
vation utility and cost of high effort. Formally, we have:
Re− 1−βð ÞI−D ehð Þ−U =0, ð6Þ
where
Re = 1−αð ÞθhR+ 1−θhð Þ 1−βð ÞR: ð7Þ
Or in rate of return terms, we have:
E re=eh
 
= dh + u: ð8Þ
We can now extract the profit share of the entrepre-
neur that will induce her to participate in the project:
1−αð Þ= 1−βð Þ1+ dh + u− 1−θhð Þ 1+ rð Þ
θh 1+rð Þ ð9Þ
or using short notations:
1−αð Þ= 1−βð ÞM epcð Þ, ð10Þ
where M(epc) represents the entrepreneur's participation
multiplier that indicates how many times the entrepre-
neur's profit-sharing ratio exceeds her capital contribu-
tion ratio. We can show that M(epc) ≤ 1[see the proof of
Proposition 1 in the appendix] leading to the result in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under observable effort the VC has a
natural bargaining power over the profit share
inducing the entrepreneur to demand a profit shar-
ing ratio that is less or equal to her capital contribu-
tion ratio.
Proposition 1 can also indicate that, under observ-
able effort, there is no emphasis on the level of expertise
of the VC which suggests lower costs for the VC in
learning about the venture. This also means that a VC
investment in reducing information asymmetries could
lead the VC to invest in projects in which they are not
expert. The latter, as they are assured of the entrepre-
neurs high effort ability, would widen the VCs scope of
investment.
From another side, the multiplier M_(epc) is posi-
tively (negatively) related to the entrepreneurs effort dis-
utility, her reservation utility, and low (high) outcomes of
the project. This suggest that entrepreneur would be will-
ing to sacrifice profit share if she believe that there is an
optimistic project outlook.
Proposition 2. To participate in a PLS contract, the entre-
preneur demands a lower profit-sharing ratio when
an optimistic profitability outlook scenario exists.
This finding suggests that an entrepreneur demand-
ing of a lower share could also signal a higher ability
entrepreneur. Finally, from Equation 10 we can obtain
the VC's profit-sharing ratio that induces the entrepre-
neur to participate in the project as follows:
αepc =1− 1−βð ÞM epcð Þ: ð11Þ
From Equation(11) and proposition (2), we could
see clearly that, under observable effort, the VC would
benefit from a higher profit share when there is a posi-
tive outlook. As explained in proposition 2, the entre-
preneur would be willing to sacrifice more profits,
benefiting the VC, when there are positive outlooks
ahead. The next section would explore the negotiation
over the profit share under entrepreneurial unobserv-
able effort.
4.2 | The model under entrepreneurial
unobservable effort
In this case, the VC is unable to observe the entrepreneur's
effort after the financing of the project has taken place.
Thus, in addition to fulfilling her participation constraints,
the VC must incite the entrepreneur to exert a high effort.
4.2.1 | Problem preliminaries
For the entrepreneur to exercise a high effort, she must
have a better payoff Uh compared to the payoff under
exercising a lower effort Ul. Interestingly we can link the
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profit share to the entrepreneur capital contribution
through an “entrepreneur's incentive constraint” multi-
plier M(eic) leading to the following proposition: [see the
proof of Proposition 3 in the appendix].
Proposition 3. To exercise a high effort, there exist an
“entrepreneur incentive constraint” multiplier M(eic)
such that the entrepreneur demands a profit sharing
ratio (1- αeic) ≥ (1-β) M(eic) relative to her capital con-
tribution in the project.
Analysing this multiplier, further, shows that it is not
necessarily greater than 1. Which means that it is not
always true that entrepreneurs would demand a higher
profit share, relative to their capital contribution, when
they hold private information about their effort. The fol-
lowing proposition explains why the latter is possible [see
the proof of Proposition 4 in the appendix].
Proposition 4. To exercise a high effort, in an un-
observable effort setting, the entrepreneur will
demand a higher profit sharing ratio than her capi-
tal contribution ratio if the sum of the marginal cost
(from exercising a lower effort) and private benefits
(from exercising a low effort) is greater than the
marginal return (from exercising a high effort).
Otherwise the entrepreneur accepts a lower sharing
ratio than her capital contribution ratio.
This proposition could be helpful to VC as a signaling
tool about the entrepreneurs effort ability. In other
words, an entrepreneur demanding a higher profit share
does not necessarily signals a high quality but could also
signal high hidden private benefits that the entrepreneur
could get by exercising a lower effort.
Using the above results and solving for α, the profit
sharing ratio required by the VC to motivate the entre-
preneur to perform a high effort satisfies:
α≤ αeic =1− 1−βð ÞM eicð Þ ð12Þ
Further analysis of the “entrepreneur's incentive compati-
bility” shows a link between the entrepreneur's reservation
utility and the entrepreneur's private benefits from exercising
a low effort. Interestingly, as the private benefits increases
above the reservation utility, the more is the entrepreneurs
required share of profit. This leads to the following proposi-
tion [see the proof of Proposition 5 in the appendix]:
Proposition 5. The entrepreneur will demand a profit-
sharing ratio higher than her capital contribution
ratio only if her private benefits from exercising a
low effort are higher than her reservation utility.
Proposition 5 could also be used as a quick signaling
mechanism. In other words, the higher is the profit share
demanded by the entrepreneur, relative to her capital con-
tribution, the more is the gap between the private benefits
they could get compared to their reservation utility.
From Proposition 5 and Equations (11) and (12), we
can infer the VC profit sharing ratioα fulfilling both the





4.3 | Satisfying the VC's participation
constraints
In the case of unobservable effort scenario, the VC works
out his payoff taking into consideration two probabilities:
• Certainty probability ph: The VC estimates a degree of
certainty regarding the willingness of the entrepreneur
to engage in high effort.
• Effort-based probability: The VC assigns a probability
to the success of the project in high and low effort
cases, thetah and thetal, respectively.
Formally, the VC will not enter the PLS contract unless
the expected return from the project is positive. i.e.,
E rð Þ= Pr+ 1−Pð Þr>0, ð14Þ
where P is the probability of the success of the project
and is given by:
P= phθh + 1−phð Þθl: ð15Þ
Given the scarcity, the innovative feature of the pro-
ject, and the unobservable effort scenario, the VC is in a
bargaining comparative disadvantage and therefore he
needs a sharing ratio αvpc that will enable him to at least
break even such that [see the proof of the following deri-
vation in Appendix A]:
αvpc = βMvpc ð16Þ
where
Mvpc =
1− 1−Pð Þð1+ r
1+r
Þ ð17Þ
is the VC's participation multiplier that represents what
the VC requires as profit sharing ratio relative to his
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capital contribution in order to participate in financing
the project. We can show that this multiplier is less than
1. This leads to the following proposition [see the proof of
Proposition 6 in the appendix]:
Proposition 6. For the VC to participate in financing a
scarce project under a PLS contract, the VC is
induced to accept a lower share of the profit relative
to his ratio of the capital contribution.
This means that the VC might be satisfied with a
profit-sharing ratio that is less than his capital ratio con-
tribution as long as he is at least breaking even. This con-
cept shows the impact of asymmetric information, such
as unobserval effort, in lowering down the profit share of
VCs. The next section shows the minimum acceptable
levels of shares that the participants would accept under
unobserval effort. These minimum acceptable levels
would constitute what we refer to a' Span of negotiation'.
4.4 | Span of negotiation
From Equations (13) and (16), we can deduce the range
of values of the sharing ratio α that the VC should get
and which can satisfy both parties:
αVPC ≤ α≤min αeic,αepc
 
: ð18Þ
From Equation (10), we can establish a span of nego-




This span must be positive for the project to be
financed. For example, the project will not be financed if
the VC profit sharing ratio (αepc required to incite the
entrepreneur to participate or to exert high effort αeic) is
less than what the VC requires to participate in the pro-
ject. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 7. In PLS contract, a span of negotiation
over the profit sharing ratio can be determined. The
VC would not finance the project unless this span
is positive. Formally:
SN >0 Project is financed
Otherwise Project is not financed:

ð20Þ
This span of negotiation has implications for VCs as it
could provide them with more flexibility over the
negotiation of a profit share. By knowing their minimum
acceptable level they can negotiate a further increase in
that profit share. This will depend on their bargaining
power. The latter is the model we try to develop next by
starting with the development of a'Nash equilibrium'.
4.5 | Nash equilibrium
In this section, we consider a strategic game in which VC
plays the role of a Stackelberg leader. The latter knows
the response function of the entrepreneur and chooses
his own action taking into account the effect of his
choices on the action of the entrepreneur. Stackelberg's
selected actions would elicit a certain desired behavior
from the follower (entrepreneur). In our strategic game,
the VC decides on the profit-sharing ratio taking into
account the self-interest behaviour of the entrepreneur. The
VC makes his decision using backward induction. In this
approach, players think about the outcomes at the last stage
of the game and then roll back thought the game tree to the
starting stage. For more on this strategic game, the reader
can consult (see [Dixit & Skeath, 2015]). Table 1 and Fig-
ures 1-4 provide summaries of all stages of the game
followed by backward induction to identify the game equi-
librium. In the following, we discuss these figures to
describe what happens at each stage of the game.
As shown in Figure 1, backward induction is used to
solve the strategic game in which the last player in its
sequence is the entrepreneur. The latter will compare her
payoffs Ue at nodes 5–9 of Figure 1. The payoffs at these
nodes are described as follows:
Ue(5) = (1 − β)I: The entrepreneur gets her reserva-
tion utility as the VC does not participate in financing
the project. She does not get her minimum required
profit share. Ue(6) = Ue/el, Ue(6) = Ue/eh, Ue(8) = Ue/el:
The entrepreneur participate in the contract, but gets a
share less than that required to incentivize her to exert a
high effort. She therefore exerts a low effort. Ue(9) = (1
− β)I: The entrepreneur gets her reservation utility as she
does not participate in the project. She does not get her
minimum required profit share.
Now since no participation from both parties is
expected at nodes (5) and (9), the VC strategies α < αVPC
and α > αepc are not feasible and therefore can be elimi-
nated from the tree.
In Figure 2, the payoff of the entrepreneur at node
6 dominates that at node 8. This is because the entrepre-
neur gets a higher share at node 6 (at which VC gets a
lower share with α ≤ min [αeic, αepc]) than at node
8 (at which VC gets higher share with α > αeic). There-
fore, this eliminates nodes 8 and subsequently node
3 and their relevant branches from the tree.
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Using Equation (12), Figure 3 shows that the entre-
preneur satisfies her participation and incentive con-
straints and therefore engages in high effort.
Consequently, the payoff to the entrepreneur at node
7 dominates that at node 6.
Finally, Figure 4 shows that the payoff of the entre-
preneur at node 2 is represented by that in node 7. More-
over, the payoff to the VC at node 2 is satisfying the VC
participation constraint [see Equation (18)], while the
entrepreneur is to perform a high effort.
From the analysis above the Nash equilibrium is: VC
offering a profit share in the form of a span of negotia-
tion: min(αeic, αepc) < α < αvpc. On the other hand the
entrepreneur commits to engaging in a high effort. The
next step then is to find the optimal profit share within
this span of negotiation. Our bargaining model will help
in achieving this objective next.
4.6 | Bargaining power model
From our earlier discussion, we have identified the span of
negotiation over the profit-sharing ratio that the VC can get
from a PLS contract. We next derive the optimum sharing
ratio taking into consideration the bargaining power of both
participants in the contract. For this, we assume that the
bargaining power depends on three parameters:
• The VC's capital contribution ratio β;
• The VC's expertise level μ;
TABLE 1 Summary of the game
Player Action Payoff Profit share Loss share
Entrepreneur ci Uci = I[(1 − α)(1 + r)θi + (1 − β)((1 + r)(1 − θi) − di − u
+ si)]
1-α 1-β
VC α V = I[α(1 + r)P + β((1 + r)(1 − P)] α β
FIGURE 1 Summary of the game: step 1
FIGURE 2 Summary of the game: step 2
FIGURE 3 Summary of the game: step 3
FIGURE 4 Summary of the game: step 4
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• The weight of importance W attached to β, and (1-W)
attached to μ. For example, if W = 50% then the VC
assigns equal importance to the capital and expertise
provided to run the project.
We start from the basic point where both participants
equally share the project capital and have the same level
of expertise (50%–50%); i.e., the span of negotiation is








which constitutes the starting point above which the VC
gets more profit share and, hence, has more bargaining
power. In the following, a change in the VC's capital con-
tribution is noted as % ΔB, and a change in the VC's
expertise level is noted as Δu  (−0.5;0.5). For example if
Δu = −0,5, then u = 50% - 0.5 = 0;. I.e, the VC has no
expertise and therefore it is the entrepreneur who has full
expertise. From the above, we can propose an optimum
profit sharing αopt to the VC:
The development of this theoretical model would not
show its effectiveness without being tested. Ideally this
could be done empirically. However, due to novelty of
this model, there is a lack of data to test it against. A bet-
ter alternative,which allows for a large analysis of data is
simulation. In our context we use'Agent Based Simula-
tion' (ABS).
5 | AGENT-BASED SIMULATION
In this section, we create an agent-based simulation
(Netlogo) platform to implement the model. This plat-
form will allow for a faster numerical calculations of
the profit share and helps decide on the validity of the
funding contract. In fact, we would run the simulation
for 1,000 times. This will allow us to run the parame-
ters of the same contract to see how many times it is
valid. i.e the span of negotiation should be positive. We
are using a threshold of 30%. This means if the contract
is 70% showing a positive span then it is valid.
Otherwise it is not. The simulation also would calcu-
late the optimum profit share out of the span of
negotiation.
The parameters considered in our simulation are
reported in Table 2.
Taking into account the stochastic nature (as measured
by standard deviations) of project revenues, we run our
model for 1,000 simulations. This high number of simula-
tions will allow for detecting profit sharing rates, which will
not fit the participation constraints and incentive con-
straints for the participants. The VC determines a threshold,
in this case 30% that if exceeded the contract will be void,
and therefore would not be financed. Figure 5 shows the
results of our simulated model.
From Figure 5, we can see that out of 1,000 simula-
tions, 109 contracts were void. This represents 12% of the
contracts, which is below the rejection threshold of 30%.
We can also see that the minimum acceptable sharing
ratio for the VC is 63.03%, while the maximum sharing
ratio for the VC, which is tolerated by the entrepreneur
is 71.02%.
TABLE 2 Simulation parameters values
Parameters
value Parameter's description
I = 100,000 Project capital
β = 70% VC capital share
u = 5% Entrepreneur reservation utility
dh = 10%,
dl = 5%




Project high and low revenues respectively
θh = 80%,
θl = 40%




Standard deviation in the estimation of θh and
θl, respectively
ph = 50% Vc's level of certainty that the entrepreneur
would perform a high effort
μ = 0% VC expertise level
W = 50% Weight of importance attached by the VC to
her contribution in project β
αopt
αaverage =WB%ΔB +Wu%Δumin αeic,αepc
 






EL FAKIR ET AL. 9
We now consider our bargaining power model. If we
start with the initial scenario where both participants have
the same capital contribution and expertise level, then the
agreed VC profit sharing ratio is αaverage = 67.11%. More-
over, since β = 70%, we have %ΔB = 20%;. I.e, the VC is
exceeding the average capital contribution by 20%. In addi-
tion, since μ = 0, the VC acknowledges that he has no
expertise in the project. Therefore, %Δu = −0.5; i.e, the VC
is 50% from the neutrality point μ = 50% at which both VC
and entrepreneur have equal expertise. We also find that
capital contribution is given equal importance as the level
of expertise in deciding on the optimum profit ratio. Thus,
the optimum profit ratio for the VC is given by:
αopt =67:11%+ 50%10%+50% −0:5ð Þ½ 
71:08%−63 : 03%½ =65:89%: ð23Þ
If we compare the value of this optimum profit
share to the average value of the profit share, we find
a difference of 1.22% in favour of the entrepreneur.
We also find that the optimum sharing ratio is closer
to the VC's acceptable minimal ratio (at which the VC
would break even) than it is to the VC's tolerated max-
imum share (at which the entrepreneur would break
even). Both findings indicate that the entrepreneur has
some relative bargaining power compared to the
VC. This is mainly due to the VC's lack of expertise in
this project and also because he is giving a significant
importance to the parameter that measures the exper-
tise level (50%) .
6 | CONCLUSIONS
This article aims to reduce moral hazard in the form of
entrepreneur's exercising a low effort in a PLS contract.
The latter contract limits the loss of each participant to
their ratio of capital contribution, which differs from the
standard VC financing contracts in which the latter
might demand extra compensation or collateral in the
case of losses. While this limitation in terms of loss adds
a security to the entrepreneur in case of liquidation, it
can also be a source of extra moral hazard that the VC
has to take into consideration when deciding his profit-
sharing ratio. To determine the profit-sharing ratio in the
context of a PLS contract, we follow four steps. We first
identify the profit-sharing ratio under perfect and observ-
able effort information. This case forms the basis for cal-
culating the profit sharing that would allow the
entrepreneur to exercise a high effort. In a second step,
we consider the case of imperfect and un-observable
effort information through which we identified a span of
negotiation for the profit sharing. While this step has the
advantage of providing flexibility in terms of profit shar-
ing negotiation, it omits the calculation of the optimum
profit sharing ratio. This in turn leads to the third step
where a bargaining power model is introduced. The latter
model depends on three parameters: VC's capital, VC's
expertise, and the importance of each of them for the
VC. The fourth and final step consists of using an agent-
based simulation (ABS) platform to implement our
model. The usefulness of the ABS platform is that it
allows for faster numerical calculation of the profit share
FIGURE 5 The agent based simulation (Netlogo) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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and helps decide on the validity of the funding contract
by using a high number of simulations. There are several
ways that one can use to extend the model. First, the
model deals with moral hazard from one side (entrepre-
neur). Thus, he model can be extended by incorporating
the shirking of the VC as well (double sided moral hazard
problem). The inclusion of the VC's shirking could be
interesting in terms of assessing the bargaining power
and, as a consequence, calculating the profit share of
each participant. A second extension could be the study
of the PLS contracts in a multiagent setting. This include
a multitude of entrepreneurs and a multitude of VCs.
This would help assess the effect of competition over
funding (from VCs side) or financing (from entrepre-
neurs' side) on the contractual terms. Finally, similar to
Fairchild (2011) who compares VC and angel financing,
another possible extension could be the comparison of
VC's financing under PLS contract and VC's financing
under conventional VC contract. This might help the
entrepreneur choose which source of financing is ade-
quate and allows PLS contractors and conventional ones
to adjust their contractual terms.
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APPENDIX A:
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
To prove that the ratio Mepc is less than or equal to 1, we
take the difference between its nominator and denomina-
tor. Mepc ≤ 1 only If the difference is less or equal to than
0. Formally, we have:
1+ dh + u− 1−θhð Þ 1+ r
 
−θh 1+ rÞð
= dh + μ− θhrÞ+ 1−θhð Þr= dh + μ−E rð Þ<0:

Thus, the above statement is true since from
Equation (8) we have E re=eh
 
= dh + uð Þ and from
Equation (5) we have E rð Þ>E re=eh
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We need to fulfill the Incentive compatibility constraint
(EIC) of the entrepreneur; that is, Uh ≥ Ul, where Uh and
Ul are the utilities of the entrepreneur under high and
low effort, respectively. Using the expectations, rate of
returns, percentage dis-utility percentage utilities and
percentage private benefits, we have:
Uh = θh 1−αð Þ 1+rð Þ+ 1−βð Þ 1−θhð Þ 1+ rð Þ−1−d ehð Þ−u½ ≥
Ulθl 1−αð Þ 1+rð Þ+ 1−βð Þ 1−θhð Þ 1+ rð Þ−1−d elð Þ−u+ s½ ,
ðA1Þ
Solving for the share of the entrepreneur (1 -α)
we get:
1−αð Þ≥ 1−βð ÞΔθ: 1+ rð Þ+Δd+ s
Δθ 1+rð Þ ,
or
1−α≥ 1−βð ÞMeic,
where we can name the manager incentive compatible
constraint multiplier Meic:
Meic =
Δθ: 1+ rð Þ+Δd + s
θh 1+rð Þ
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
To prove that Meic is not necessarily greater than 1, we take
the difference between its nominator and denominator:
Δθ: 1+ rð Þ+Δd+ s−θh 1+rð Þ=Δd+ s−Δθ r−rð Þ:
Thus,
Meic
<1 if Δd+ s<Δθ r−rð Þ
>1 if Δd+ s>Δθ r−rð Þ:

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
The proof of Proposition 4 follows directly from the last
result in Proposition 5.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
We must prove that it is not always true that (1- αeic) >
(1- αepc). We have





Taking the difference, we get:
1−αeicð Þ− 1−αepc
 
= θl 1+ dh + u+ λ s−uð Þ½ 
where λ= θh=θl >1
This difference is not necessarily greater than 0 as it
depends essentially on the difference between the private
benefit s that the entrepreneur can get from providing
high effort and the reservation utility u from not partici-
pating in the project. Formally, we have:
αeic
< αepc if s > u
> αepc if s < u:

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
The VC participation constraint is given by:
vpc :Pα 1+rð ÞI + 1−Pð Þβ 1+ rð ÞI−βI≥0:
Solving for α we get:
α≥αvpc = β
1− 1−Pð Þ 1+ rð Þ
1+ Rð ÞP ,
where
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Mvpc = β
1− 1−Pð Þ 1+ rð Þ
1+rð ÞP :
This multiplier is less than or equal to 1. This can be
proven by taking the difference between the nominator
and the denominator of this multiplier and finding that
the difference is negative:
1− 1−Pð Þ 1+ rð Þ− 1+ Rð ÞP= − P+ 1−Pð Þr½ = −E rð Þ≤ 0:
The last statement is true as the VC cannot enter the
contract if the expected return from the project is nega-
tive; see Equation (14).
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